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Abstract
Education as cultural cultivation includes the practice of caring for ideas. But what is the 
nature of ideas and what is their role in the educational process? How do ideas relate to 
ideals? And should (educational) ideas be “put into practice”? Is this possible, and 
desirable? It is argued in this contribution that we should we be more careful about the 
role of ideas in the process of education and our lives in general. 
The paper starts with commentaries on philosophical and etymological backgrounds, and 
then addresses the question of what makes ideas “successful”. Two apparently successful 
ideas are exemplary discussed, namely, the idea of the nobleness of the heart, and the idea 
of authentic living. Additionally, the topic is raised how to deal with educational ideas 
appropriately, and a plea for “modest ideas” is expressed.
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In the epilogue of his Personal Impressions, Isaiah Berlin wrote the following: “My 
interest in ideas, my belief in their tremendous and sometimes disastrous power, my 
conviction that man, if he does not comprehend these ideas fully, is threatened by them 
much more than by the uncontrolled forces of nature or by his own institutions – all 
this is confirmed by what is going in the world on a daily basis.” (2001, pp. 372 f.).1) 
Ideas are more than innocent thought bubbles; they are able, when becoming relevant, 
to trigger off effects that influence life and living together positively as well as 
negatively. They may, if they become full of “passionate enthusiasm” (“leidenschaftlicher 
Überschwang”), to cite Berlin again, lend wings to the arts and destroy life (p. 375). 
In the following, a commentary to the philosophical backgrounds of etymology is 
presented, then the topic of what makes ideas “successful” is addressed, and then, 
using, among others, the example of the idea of education, how to think of dealing 
with ideas in a reasonable manner is discussed. Some brief remarks on “modest” ideas 
complete the contribution. 
Etymological and Conceptual Comments
In colloquial speech, the term idea is used in the sense of the meaning of “thoughts,” 
“imagination,” “notion,” “model,” or “ideal,” while the classical Greek idéa originally 
refers back to figure or form and also to the archetype, respectively. “Idea” is a 
transliteration of a Greek term that originally refers back to seeing and recognizing 
forms or shapes (cf. Urmson, 1967, p. 118). In Plato’s Republic, the “idea of the good” 
is presented as the “the highest subject of knowledge” (Plato, 1961, p. 257). In his 
so-called theory of ideas (or theory of forms), ideas act as eternal archetypes of things. 
Immanuel Kant offers a specifying comment on Plato: “For him, the ideas represent the 
archetypes of things in themselves and not only the keys to possible experiences as the 
categories,” and “with no literary analysis, in order to perceive the meaning that the 
noble philosopher related to his phrase.” (1975, p. 142, translated by D. W.).2) In the 
1) German version: “Mein Interesse an Ideen, mein Glaube an ihre gewaltige und manchmal unheilvolle Macht, 
meine Überzeugung, dass der Mensch, wenn er diese Ideen nicht richtig begreift, von ihnen viel stärker bedroht 
wird als von den unkontrollierten Naturgewalten oder auch seinen eigenen Institutionen – all das wird von den 
Vorgängen in der Welt tagtäglich neu bestärkt”. 
2) German original: “Die Ideen sind bei ihm Urbilder der Dinge selbst und nicht bloss Schlüssel zu möglichen 
Erfahrungen wie die Kategorien,” yet, according to Kant, he does want to engage „in keine literarische 
Untersuchung […], um den Sinn auszumachen, den der erhabene Philosoph mit seinem Ausdrucke verband”. 
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history of philosophy, the platonic perspective has been dealt with or problematized in 
the Universalienstreit (“problem of universals”; cf. de Libera, 2005). As objects of the 
mind, ideas are contradistinctive to “mere” objects of perception and relate to – especially 
from a platonic perspective – the state and the essence of things as they exist “truly” 
and as entities independent from the empirical world. While ideas can be understood as 
“universals” in this manner, there is already a notion with a slightly different emphasis 
in Plato’s work also, namely that of the idea as a pragmatic form that finds its 
expression as imitations or incomplete and deficient copies in the world of concrete 
phenomena (Urmson, 1967, p. 118). As a result, there is a certain degree of thematic 
tension that arises between the understanding of ideas as pure universals on the one 
hand and the understanding of ideas as similarities whose access is made possible in 
the and through the phenomenal world on the other hand. 
As eternal and independent paradigms, ideas receive the status of God’s though in 
Christian theology, and understood as a pattern, design, or plan, the concept of the idea 
finds a home as well in the minds of men, to some extent, in medieval theology (cf. 
Leppin, 2007). The two meanings – idea as mental thought and idea as pattern or 
example of an object or phenomenon – are not, however, disconnected from each other; 
moreover, they coincide eventually in the notion of the idea as a “mental 
representation.” The image- or imagery-character of the idea and the ideational or ideal 
(imagined as exemplary status as well) remains the same due to the existing and 
nuanced differences.3) Different philosophical perspectives and attitudes regarding the 
nature of ideas concern epistemological questions and differences of origin (of ideas and 
the ideal) as well as of the ontological status; for the main part, rationalistic, empiristic 
or sensualistic, yet also nativistic positions are or were facing each other here. The 
questions if and/or to what extent ideas are “inherent,” “universal,” “independent,” 
“eternal,” “abstract,” or yet “concrete” and “culturally bound” may be taking a back 
seat today – at least, if it concerns the significance and effect of ideas in human 
actions and coexistence. 
In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), Kant argues: “For me, 
the idea represents a necessary concept of reason to whose meaningfulness no 
coinciding object can be offered […]. They are concepts of pure reason; since they 
contemplate all insights of experience as determined by an absolute totality of 
3) “Idee bedeutet eigentlich einen Vernunftbegriff, und Ideal die Vorstellung eines einzelnen als einer Idee 
adäquaten Wesens,” differentiates Kant in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment; 1991, p. 114; “Idea 
rather signifies a concept of reason and ideal the imagination of a single entity adequate to an idea.”). 
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conditions. They are not made up deliberately, but given to reason itself by nature and, 
therefore, refer to using the full intellect necessarily.” (1975, p. 147, translated by D. 
W.).4) Ideas as “transcendental concepts of reason” are “just ideas”, but therewith not 
all “superfluous” (“überflüssig”) or “invalid” (“nichtig”, p. 149), instead they serve the 
different forms of intellect – i.e. the empirical use of intellect (p. 207) – “mostly 
unnoticed” as guidelines (“canon”) and thereby help to lead the cognitive process (p. 
149). As such “regulative principles,” ideas offer larger unities than the empirical use of 
intellect ever could achieve, which also means that they enable insights to be gained 
from contradictions and quarrels (of intellect) through “admittedly brilliant, yet 
treacherous semblance” (“zwar glänzenden, aber trügenden Schein”) as well as 
“persuasions and imagined knowledge” (ibid.). As a result, the productive negativity of 
the practice relating to the critique of reason finds expression. It is, according to 
Hannah Arendt in her reading of Kant, solely “‘the negative that represents the actual 
enlightenment.’ Enlightenment signifies […] being exempt from prejudices, authorities, it 
signifies a purging act”; 1998, p. 47; translated by D. W.),5) leaving the “cave of 
opinions” (“Höhle der Meinungen” p. 76). In contrast to the intellect, reason does not 
solve problems; reason rather helps to irritate and derange beliefs that cannot withstand 
enlightening critique. On the other side, a rational idea cannot be confirmed by pure 
empiricism. 
The aesthetic idea serves as a complimentary concept to the rational idea for Kant: 
“[B]ut an aesthetic idea, for me, is the notion of imagination that instigates a lot of 
thinking without there being a specific thought, i.e. term, that is adequate, which no 
language fully reaches and can make comprehensible by implication (1991, p. 246, 
translated by D. W.).6) It is easily discernible “[T]hat it is the counterpart (pendant) of 
a rational idea, which in turn is a term that has no adequate perception (notion of 
imagination (ibid.; transl. D. W.).7) In doing so, the idea’s imagery or “imaginedness” 
4) German original: “Ich verstehe unter der Idee einen notwendigen Vernunftbegriff, dem kein kongruierender 
Gegenstand in den Sinnen gegeben werden kann […]. Sie sind Begriffe der reinen Vernunft; denn sie betrachten alle 
Erfahrungserkenntnis als bestimmt durch eine absolute Totalität der Bedingungen. Sie sind nicht willkürlich erdichtet, 
sondern durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben und beziehen sich daher notwendigerweise auf den ganzen 
Verstandesgebrauch”. 
5) German original: “‘das Negative welches die eigentliche Aufklärung ausmacht.’ Aufklärung meine [...] Befreiung von 
Vorurteilen, von Autoritäten, meint einen reinigenden Vorgang”. 
6) German original: “[U]nter einer ästhetischen Idee aber verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, 
die viel zu denken veranlasst, ohne dass ihr doch irgendein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. Begriff, adäquat sein kann, 
die folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann”.
7) German original: “dass sie das Gegenstück (Pendant) von einer Vernunftidee sei, welche umgekehrt ein Begriffist, dem 
keine Anschauung (Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft) adäquat sein kann”.
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(“Imaginiertheit”) is emphasized – in contrast to the “rational idea” or also the 
“transcendental idea”; a difference that is not to be found in the platonic doctrine of 
forms in this firm manner. Aesthetic ideas give language and form to experience that it 
could not offer from within by itself. „Such a notion of imagination can be called 
ideas: on the one hand, therefore, since they, at least, strive for something that lies 
beyond the boundaries of experience and thus try to come near a representation of the 
concepts of reason (of the intellectual ideas) what gives them the semblance of an 
objective reality; on the other hand and indeed primarily, since there is no completely 
adequate term for them as inner perceptions.” (ibid., p. 246 f.; transl. D. W.).8) In this 
context, Kant puts a special emphasis on the importance of poetry or the poets at this 
point in his Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment): The poet dares to sensualize 
rational ideas of invisible entities, the realm of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation and 
suchlike; or also that which finds indeed examples in experience, e.g. death, envy and 
all vices, also love, glory and suchlike, beyond the limitations of experience, by means 
of an imagination that tries to equal the foreplay of reason in order to reach the 
highest level to sensualize it in a completeness for which there exists no example in 
nature; and essentially, it is poetry in which the capability of aesthetic ideas can show 
itself to its full extent. Yet, this capability, regarded individually, is only a talent (of 
imagination).” (ibid., p. 247, transl. D. W.).9) 
Following these philosophical contemplations on the essence of the idea that referred 
to two essentially pertinent approaches, the next part addresses a contemporary 
understanding of the concept. 
8) German original: “Man kann dergleichen Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft Ideen nennen: einesteils darum, weil 
sie zu etwas über die Erfahrungsgrenze hinaus Liegendem wenigstens streben, und so einer Darstellung der 
Vernunftbegriffe (der intellektuellen Ideen) nahe zu kommen suchen, welches ihnen en Anschein einer 
objektiven Realität gibt; andererseits, und zwar hauptsächlich, weil ihnen, als innern Anschauungen, kein Begriff 
völlig adäquat sein kann”. 
9) “Der Dichter wagt es, Vernunftideen von unsichtbaren Wesen, das Reich der Seligen, das Höllenreich, die Ewigkeit, 
die Schöpfung u. dgl. zu versinnlichen; oder auch das, was zwar Beispiele in der Erfahrung findet, z.B. den Tod, den 
Neid und alle Laster, imgleichen die Liebe, den Ruhm u. dgl. über die Schranken der Erfahrung hinaus, vermittelst einer 
Einbildungskraft, die dem Vernunft-Vorspiele in Erreichung eines Grössten nacheifert, in einer Vollständigkeit 
sinnlich zu machen, für die sich in der Natur kein Beispiel findet; und es ist eigentlich die Dichtkunst, in welcher sich 
das Vermögen ästhetischer Ideen in seinem ganzen Masse zeigen kann. Dieses Vermögen aber, für sich allein 
betrachtet, ist eigentlich nur ein Talent (der Einbildungskraft)”.
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“Successful” Ideas – Two Examples
Ideas may have effects or they might remain inoperative to a large extent. Ideas are 
only in so far effective as they are shared by (enough) people – be that more or less 
implicit or yet articulated –, as they are, in a sense, able to “spread,” and find a place 
in the hearts and minds of people. According to Eva Illouz, successful ideas have to 
fulfill at least three conditions: (1) They have to “match” the social situation, i.e. to 
explain the experiences of the social actors to themselves among other things. (2) They 
have to offer orientation, especially in the areas of life that are deemed as important, 
and (3) they “have to be institutionalized in social networks and circulate”; 2009, p. 
41). This is not possible without exhibiting appropriate qualities regarding 
comprehensibility and simplicity of the thought transported as idea. In this context, the 
imagery or clarity and/or the metaphoric persuasiveness play an important role above 
all. In effect, the force of the repetition hammer joins in and a certain “memetic 
contamination.” What is the meaning of this? You may look at pictures, read words, or 
hear melodies and contemplate; yet, in secret, you will become, so to speak, “infected” 
by these perceptions and do not notice the contamination, maybe not even later on (cf. 
Sebök, 2008, p. 196) – or it is compared with education and subjectivity. The parasitic 
culture of memes, as Sebök states it based on Daniel Dennett’s idea of “mimetics,” 
consists of ideas and fragments of ideas that you encounter choosing people, in a sense, 
as hosts and striving for one thing only basically, namely being copied. Memes (i.e. 
ideas) can be stronger than genes: “The memes regarding suicide, celibacy and vows of 
virginity are viable, although they are hardly consistent with the imperative of our 
genes” (ibid., p. 206, transl. D. W.).10)
How do the nature of genes and the culture of memes interact with each other? 
Maybe like this: Humans may be constructed as “gene machines,” yet they are rather 
educated and socialized as “meme machines” (cf. ibid., p. 210). Individuality itself – 
the authentic lifestyle – is one these successful modern memes that have spread far and 
wide over the globe; it represents a political, psychological, and pedagogical idea 
(infection) which is highly significant and resilient. The virus may change, yet its core 
is amazingly stable: It is the idea that living your own life is possible. “To live your 
own life” is, of course, still not a universally accepted ideal.11)
10) German original: “Die Meme des Selbstmords, des Zölibats und des Jungfräulichkeitsgelübdes sind lebensfähig, 
obwohl sie mit dem Imperativ unserer Gene kaum vereinbar sind”.
11) The Indian-British psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar describes a scene that happened in India in an interview (von Thadden, 
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In the following, two examples of “successful” ideas are illustrated in more detail: 
the idea of nobleness of the heart and the idea of authentic living. 
The Idea of Nobleness of the Heart
It is difficult to imagine that ideas become successful if they are not useful or 
helpful in explaining experiences, i.e. making them perceptible, to humans as 
self-interpreting animals (cf. Taylor, 1985). In addition, imagery or metaphorical content 
are, as mentioned, extremely important. Admittedly, the use of metaphors represents 
“inauthentic” talk, quasi the acknowledgement that the objective portrayal of reality is 
not possible in human affairs, yet we have no choice but to find an expression for our 
thoughts, desires, and feelings with which we are able to convey ourselves to ourselves 
and to others. For example, we understand what is meant by expressions like 
“nobleness of the heart,” “matter of the heart,” “cold,” “soft,” or “big” heart, we 
understand the meaning of “stout-hearted” actions, and so forth. The use of the heart 
metaphor is by no means pure emotional imagery, even in its somewhat modest, yet 
significant forms, e.g. the “broken” heart or the idiom “with heart and soul.” Instead, 
an idea is transported with or through its use that explains the nature of humans or 
how they should have to be. In Greek antiquity, the heart was ascribed the seat of the 
soul for some time. Thereafter, the soul changed its place of residence and moved to 
the brain for a couple of centuries. Yet with Franz Brentano (1838–1917), at the latest, 
whose philosophical studies on psychology and psychological analyses of philosophy 
influenced Edmund Husserl, Alexius von Meinong, and, of course, Sigmund Freud, the 
soul has left the brain as well and then the body in general after all and is now 
regarded as a phenomenon of the body only, respectively. According to Brentano 
already in the 19th century, psychology, as a matter of fact, has nothing to contribute 
regarding the soul, but still something regarding psychical phenomena. This is no small 
thing, although psyche signifies only “wisp” or “breath” in classical Greek, but the draft 
of air continues to remain significant as a metaphor for life or soul and it gives 
psychology its name to this day. Yet, who examines the phenomena of the soul does 
not examine the soul itself; who questions the use of the heart metaphor does not 
observe the heart – it is rather about the cultural awareness of soul in the first place. 
2005): A married couple visited him in his office with their daughter: The daughter, so the father, suffers from this 
disease that is called “autonomy” in Europe; his daughter was actually under the impression that she herself knows what 
is best for her; and would it be possible for him, Kakar, to help the family? 
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The idea of nobleness of the soul refers to the manner in which the individual 
conducts his- or herself in respect to itself and the outside world, how it deals with 
itself and the outside world, and which habits it develops in doing so. Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who should have analyzed and described the developments in the “New 
World” on behalf of the postrevolutionary French government, used the nice expression 
“habits of the heart” (“habitudes de cœur”) in the second volume of his work 
Democracy in America (Über die Demokratie in Amerika), published between 1835 and 
1840 (Tocqueville 1987). With this expression, he refers to attitudes, customs, and 
rituals that should prevent from the consequences which may entail the disappointed 
control illusions inherent in democratic communities. In contrast to authoritarian 
constitutions, there are dangers within the soft despotism of democracy that should be 
and also have to be met on the level of emotional development. Therefore, nobleness of 
the heart is not a private matter for de Tocqueville and it does not only or primarily 
concern the individual.12) 
Based on the example of the heart metaphor, it becomes apparent how persistent and 
practically significant ideas can be. 
The Idea of Authentic Living
A second example concerns the ideational influence of the so-called humanistic 
psychology. Carl Rogers has to be regarded as one of the key figures of popularizing 
psychology certainly. The fundamental basis for his “success” is a “substantially 
simplified Freudian theory” (Illouz, 2009, p. 267) that has been able to turn the 
fatalistic determinism and cultural pessimism of classical psychoanalysis into its 
“American-optimistic” opposite. Rogers ‘theory (Rogers, 2005, 2007) is based on the 
“simple idea of a tendency for self-realization, understood as a motivation inherent in 
every lifeform to develop its potential to the greatest extent possible.” (Illouz, 2009, p. 
268, transl. D. W.). The good news and the implicit purpose consists in the 
voluntaristic premise, according to which “each crisis [gives] the self the opportunity to 
grow and to master the world” (ibid.). Psychology, i.e. what is assumed as psychology 
or what has become used to act as such in a rather immodest way, was able to 
affiliate itself through the doctrine of growth and development with the impressive ethos 
12) Helena Flam states in Soziologie der Emotionen (“Sociology of Emotions;” 2002) that political power can also 
be seen in controlling and influencing emotional reactions of citizens. This power may dwindle and might be 
lost completely, as any kind of power does. 
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of self-help rooted in the USA and to establish a perspective, according to which 
“growth and maturity were inherent parts of life” “that would be achieved through 
conscious force of will” (ibid.)13) While humans were to be understood as morally good 
in principle and natural development as sound in principle from the romantic standpoint, 
the mental and psychic health could be regarded as a general case of human 
development at the same time. As a consequence, to be healthy means to (be able to) 
develop one’s potential as much as possible at any time – to be “fully alive,” as 
Rogers and Freiberg (1994) state, to be a “fully functioning person” and for a teacher, 
to be “fully alive in the classroom,” for example (cf. Rogers, 1969; Rogers & Freiberg 
1994). 
The therapeutic ethos formulates and norms the idea and the ideal of authentic living. 
In doing so, it is crucial that the need for self-realization is understood as original and 
natural and not in the least as a secondary need and as culturally contingent. Through 
this “natural” developmental guideline, however, the individual is also bound to be a 
free actor: It would be “a mistake” if individuals would refrain from “making the best 
out of every moment of their existence and to justice to this existence in the way it 
was given to them” (Illouz, 2009, p. 269). Who gets left behind the psychological ideal 
of self-realization is – as a matter of degree – to be regarded as “invalid” in the end. 
Abraham Maslow, who was groomed, so to speak, by Rogers, states accordingly: “We 
call individuals ‘insane’ who are not themselves, the individuals who have built every 
neurotic barrier imaginable not to be human.” (cit. in ibid., p. 270, transl. D. W.). The 
happy and normal life is the self-realized life. 
The power of the idea of authentic living leads to the maxim: “I am okay and 
deserve to be happy” (cf. Wilson, 2009 p. 143). The therapeutic discourse is 
performative in this context; it does not “only” alter the understanding of self- and of 
social relations, but rather these relations themselves. Discourses have a performative 
character if they are able to designate and alter reality in their own right and if those 
individuals who take part in these discourses stand for the “symbolic capital” of the 
group that they represent (cf. Illouz, 2009, p. 102). Whereas normality still represented 
an “extremely mentally fragile condition, the end result of a complex and rather rare 
maturing process” (ibid., p. 81), for Freud, the happy life acts as the normal life today, 
the unhappy life as the invalid life. The success of the therapeutic ethos has to be 
brought into question also as a side effect of democratization as well as its 
13) German version: “Wachstum und Reife [seien] inhärente Bestandteile des Lebenslaufs, “„die durch bewusste 
Willensakte zu erreichen wären”.
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psychopathological basics – i.e. the new, at the same time socially acceptable as well as 
more sensitively perceived psychological suffering (to suffer more consciously and not 
have to tolerate suffering). Psychological suffering and disorders – neglected childhood, 
lack of self-esteem, workaholism, sexual disorders, diverse experiences of abuse of 
different, various phobias and much else – are quasi “democratic, since they can no 
longer be attributed to a [specific] class”; ibid., p. 68).14)
On How to Deal with Ideas Appropriately 
– the Example of Education
Ideas do not – even and especially as regulative main ideas – represent truths and 
realities; as products of the imagination, they rather help to structure the perception of 
reality and to provide orientation regarding actions. In doing so, they might sharpen and 
support the attention to what is true, appropriate, and decent as well as the attention to 
the common world. Ideas are not born out of nothingness, their creation is definitely 
governed by – speaking from a cognitive psychological standpoint – our (mental) 
concept system, but also – and this appears to be of greater importance – by the 
underlying cultural assets of self-conception and the metaphorical conditions regarding 
our possibilities to describe ourselves that are connected to them. 
For the most part, no specific idea can hold more truth than any other idea. 
Analogous to metaphors, nevertheless, that typically put an emphasis on aspects while 
others are moved to the background or hidden completely (Lakoff & Johnson, 2000), 
however, ideas represent the expression of possible points of view and orientation. The 
goals connected to this – e.g. in the conflict between the idea of freedom and the idea 
of equality “conflict with one another from time to time: In many cases, there are 
tormented decisions regarding one thing or another and coming to unpleasant 
compromises”; Berlin, 2001, p. 374). That the ideals connected to the ideas cannot be 
achieved or realized – or not easily or as desired – is part of the normal or else bitter 
experience of human kind. The question is how to deal with this shortcoming. Whether 
the inaccessibility and practical incapability of the idea argue for or against the high 
ideal or the beautiful idea in reality may be debatable – a condition that might not 
ever change. Berlin states somewhat bitterly or ironically: “There is always something 
14) In contrast to epidemiology, etiology, and psychopathology at the beginning of the 20th century. 
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that prevents the ideal’s realization here on earth,” and “Since, apparently, you only 
need to remove this one obstacle from humanity’s path, no sacrifice, therefore, can be 
big enough, as long as you advance towards the goal only in this manner. No believe 
has brought more violence, oppression, and misery over mankind. With the demand that 
the real present must be sacrificed for an ideal future that can be achieved, the worst 
cruelties were tried to be justified” (2001, p. 373).15) To endure an incomplete life and 
a world that could and also should always be better as it is may seem apolitical, but it 
is perhaps just one of the most important and also political virtues. Because there is 
always a mistake: “However you wanted to imagine a permanent condition, even under 
conditions of perfected knowledge: there is always something wrong because of the 
infinite and constant change of all conditions.” (Jaspers, 2013 p. 368, transl. D. W.).16) 
There is no surprise, therefore, that Berlin chose Kant’s accordingly beautiful expression 
as the title of his book on the history of ideas, The Crooked Timber of Humanity 
(1990), particularly the part of the original that runs as follows: “[O]f such crooked 
wood, of which man is made of, nothing fully straight can be timbered. Only the 
approximation to this idea is inflicted upon us by nature […].” (Kant, 1975 p. 41, 
transl. D. W.).17)
The “crooked timber of humanity” could also influence and promote the way in 
which the idea of education is dealt with. The culturally so comprehensive notion of 
the developmental task of humanity and its personification could cause the appreciation 
and further cultivation of this wealth of ideas. The US-American educational philosopher 
Nel Noddings (1992) used – albeit in a somewhat different context – the expression 
“caring for ideas.” Ideas need care. It is not so much a question of wanting to realize 
them compulsively, but rather a question of getting to know and appreciate their 
manifold orientation functions in describing the world (also of education and 
upbringing). The majority of superficial talk and spiteful disputes would, thereby, 
become superfluous, since the futility of this course of action can be recognized in 
15) German version: “Immer gibt es etwas, das die Verwirklichung des Ideals hier auf Erden verhindert. Da man offenbar 
nur dieses eine Hindernis aus dem Pfad der Menschheit zu entfernen braucht, kann folglich kein Opfer zu gross sein, 
solange man nur so dem Ziel näher kommt. Kein Glaube hat mehr Gewalt, Unterdrückung und Leid über die Menschen 
gebracht. Mit der Forderung, die reale Gegenwart müsse einer erreichbaren idealen Zukunft geopfert werden, hat man 
die schlimmsten Grausamkeiten zu rechtfertigen gesucht”.
16) German original: “Wie auch immer man sich einen Dauerzustand vorstellen wollte, selbst unter Voraussetzung 
vollendeter Erkenntnis: stets stimmt etwas nicht wegen der Endlosigkeit aller sich unablässig wandelnden 
Bedingungen”.
17) German original: “[A]us so krummen Holze, als woraus der Mensch gemacht ist, kann nichts ganz Gerades 
gezimmert werden. Nur die Annäherung zu dieser Idee ist uns von der Natur auferlegt [...]”.
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doing so. Who would like to deny, for example, the significance of the idea of 
“negativity” for the understanding of education, which finds expression with Socrates 
who acts, therefore, as prototype, so to speak, of the idea of enlightenment. Arendt 
paraphrases this though as follows:” “If the winds of thought that I will awaken in you 
now have roused you from your sleep and made you feel fully awake and alive, then 
you will think that you have nothing in your hands but perplexity, and what is best 
still is to make it our common cause.” (Arendt, 1998, p. 174 f.; transl. D. W.).18) Who 
would and could want to offer a completely different idea of education or to describe it 
as more correct or useful in opposition to the one that Wilhelm von Humboldt put at 
the center of consideration: “The correlation of our self with the world seems to be, at 
first glance maybe, not only an incomprehensible expression, but also an overextended 
thought. Upon closer examination, however, at least the last doubt will vanish and it 
will become clear that if you find the true pursuit of the human intellect (that what 
contains its highest spark as well as its most powerless endeavor), it is impossible to 
be content with anything of a lesser quality” (1969, p. 29).19) How could you deny, to 
give another example, the significance of work for the expression of experience in this 
context – a focus set by the French philosopher Marcel Gauchet: “Learning how to 
read does not only mean to familiarize oneself with written symbols, but also to be 
captured by a world that has been there prior to us in full armor and defends the 
overall context to the furthermost corner; the solution is to come across a binding order 
that offers final orientation when meeting others and defining one’s own standpoint by, 
starting at the lowest level, gradually giving form to human experience through working 
on the expression. At this point, it is truly appropriate to talk about culture.” (cit. and 
trans. in Foray, 2007, p. 624, transl. D.W.).20)
This and many other ideas do not compete with each other, however, they do not 
18) “Wenn dich der Wind des Denkens, den ich jetzt in dir erwecken werde, aus dem Schlaf geweckt und völlig wach und 
lebendig gemacht hat, dann wirst du erkennen, dass du nichts in der Hand hast als Ratlosigkeit, und das Beste ist immer 
noch, sie zu unserer gemeinsamen Sache zu machen.
19) German original: “Die Verknüpfung unsres Ichs mit der Welt scheint vielleicht auf den ersten Augenblick nicht nur ein 
unverständlicher Ausdruck, sondern auch ein überspannter Gedanke. Bei genauerer Untersuchung aber wird 
wenigstens der letzte Verdacht verschwinden, und es wird sich zeigen, dass, wenn man einmal das wahre Streben des 
menschlichen Geistes (das, worin ebenso sein höchster Schwung als sein ohnmächtigster Versuch enthalten ist) 
aufsucht, man unmöglich bei etwas Geringerem stehen bleiben kann”.
20) German version: “Lesen zu lernen, heißt nicht allein, sich mit nützlichen schriftlichen Zeichen vertraut zu machen, 
sondern auch von einer Welt erfasst zu werden, die in voller Rüstung schon vor uns da war und noch im hintersten 
Winkel für den Gesamtzusammenhang einsteht; es heißt, auf eine bindende Ordnung zu treffen, die letzte Orientierung 
bietet bei der Begegnung mit anderen und der eigenen Standortbestimmung, indem vom niedrigsten Niveau an über die 
Arbeit am Ausdruck der menschlichen Erfahrung nach und nach eine Form gegeben wird. Hier ist es wirklich einmal 
voll und ganz angebracht, von Kultur zu sprechen”.
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form a beautiful entirety either; they rather help us to understand and address education 
in different ways. In doing so, the fact that this discourse does not represent an 
occidental and, by no means, a German exclusivity has sometimes been forgotten. There 
is, for example, an old movement in the Confucian way of thinking that seeks to 
understand education as quest or exploratory movement of mankind. In Mengzi (resp. 
Mencius, 370–290 BC), the following part on the nobleness of the heart (xinxue) can 
be found: “Duty is the natural way of mankind. How sad it is, if you leave your way 
and do not walk on it, if you lose your heart and you do not know how to find it 
again! If an individual loses a chicken or a dog, he or she knows how to find it again; 
but the heart gets lost and he or she does not know how to look for it. Education 
serves us to do nothing else than to look for our missing heart.” – A somewhat starker 
translation might read as follows: “When their dog or chicken is lost, they go looking 
for it, but when their heart-mind is lost, they do not bother.” (2012, p. 2004).21) That 
education should exclusively consist of finding the missing heart or heart-mind 
represents a sharp turn. In my judgment, the passage translated into German is also 
remarkable for a number of reasons. First of all, education is more or less put on a 
level with xinxue. Secondly, according to Menzius, the problem does not consist 
primarily in not finding, but rather in not knowing how to look for it. Thirdly, 
education does not give the promise of finding the missing heart, but of being able to 
look for it again. This point of view and metaphor of education is not consistent and 
undisputed either, however: Idealistic (e.g. Wang Yan-ming, 1472–1529) and rationalistic 
(e.g. Chu Hsi, 1130–1200) tendencies in (Neo-) Confucian thinking differ from each 
other regarding the concept of education to a great extent. Accordingly, the role of 
knowledge and of obtaining knowledge is disputed. Some favor introspection, others the 
study of texts (cf. Reichenbach, 2018, pp. 181–197). 
Of course, ideas of education seem to contradict each other occasionally. For 
example, it is possible to set Alfred North Whitehead’s concept of education against the 
one by Confucius. Whitehead postulated three criteria for “sophistication,” i.e. education 
(cf. Kann & Sölch, 2012): mental activity, aesthetic receptivity, and sense of humanity. 
He held the belief that the process of education can only gain momentum and bear 
fruit through “romance.” Without interest in the subject, any kind of knowledge 
21) German version: “Pflicht ist der natürliche Weg des Menschen. Wie traurig ist es, wenn einer seinen Weg verlässt und 
nicht darauf wandelt, wenn einer sein Herz verloren gehen lässt und nicht weiß, wie er es wieder finden kann! Wenn 
einem Menschen ein Huhn oder ein Hund verloren geht, so weiß er, wie er sie wieder finden kann; aber sein Herz geht 
ihm verloren, und er weiß nicht, wie suchen. Die Bildung dient uns zu nichts anderem als dazu, unser verloren 
gegangenes Herz zu suchen”. 
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acquisition is futile. The “stage of romance” is followed by the stage of “precision” 
and, finally, the stage of “generalization”. According to Whitehead, any endeavor to 
advance in education is futile without interest for and emotional commitment to the 
subject. And it is easy to understand why. At the stage of romance, the subject matter 
still possesses the “vitality of the unprecedented” (ibid., p. 59). Here, the perspective for 
“the countless possibilities of connecting and re-contextualizing material and intellectual 
objects” (ibid., p. 28, transl. D. W.) is opened up. A cognitive but also emotional 
perception of objects is concerned. There is a lot of freedom but little discipline 
present. Freedom and discipline are not antagonists, they are rather thought as being in 
a natural pendular movement, “a back and forth” that corresponds to “the developing 
personality” (ibid., p. 75). “It is my firm belief that the cause for so many failures in 
the past is the lack of thorough studies of the appropriate status of romance. Without 
the adventure of romance, you will achieve, at best, passive knowledge without 
initiative and, at worst, contempt for ideas – without knowledge.” (ibid., p. 78).22) For 
Whitehead, the success of the Montessori Method of Education lies solely in the fact 
that the “dominance of romanticism” (ibid. p. 64) during childhood is fully 
acknowledged there. At the precision stage, the manifold experienced relations of a 
subject field are arranged and determined in greater detail; this is done by grammatical, 
logical, and mathematical structures and it is instructive “for a systematic continuation 
of the romantic gathering of facts” (ibid., p. 19). For Whitehead, it is literally “evident 
that a stage of precision is unproductive” without a previous stage of romance (ibid., p. 
60). At the stage of precision, the students learn “to accept a predefined manner of 
analyzing facts little by little. New facts are added, but those facts are the ones that 
insert themselves into the analysis.” (ibid.).23) It could be said that the stage of 
precision is centered on disciplining the mind for the most part. At the stage of 
generalization, finally, there is a “reaction towards romance”; ibid., p. 82, transl. D. W.) 
taking place now. This is the crucial stage; here, the mind is let free a bit at least, so 
to speak. At this stage, “the details are shaken off in favor of the active application of 
principles […], whereby the details withdraw into unconscious habits”; ibid., p. 83, 
transl. D. W.). With the accomplished stage of generalization, the foundation is laid for 
22) German version: “Es ist mein fester Glaube,” so Whitehead, “dass die Ursache für so viele Fehlschläge in der 
Vergangenheit an dem Mangel an sorgfältiger Untersuchung des angemessenen Stellenwertes der Schwärmerei liegt. 
Ohne das Abenteuer der Schwärmerei wird man bestenfalls passives Wissen ohne Initiative erreichen, und 
schlimmstenfalls erreicht man Geringschätzung für Ideen – ohne Wissen”.
23) German version: Lernen, “Stück für Stück eine vorgegebene Art des Analysierens von Tatsachen zu akzeptieren. Neue 
Tatsachen werden hinzugefügt, aber es sind diejenigen Tatsachen, die sich in die Analyse einfügen”. 
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a new phase of romance and the cycle starts afresh. 
In the discussions of Confucius (1979), however, there is an almost contradictory idea 
of education to be found. Learning seems to always give pleasure – at least to himself: 
“Is it not a pleasure to learn and to repeat and practice from time to time what has been 
learned?” (ibid., p. 59). If, strictly speaking, the idea of education is concerned in that 
case, the acquisition of knowledge and capabilities represents a condition of “love” – or 
of “romance” – for the object. The evaluation of the feelings’ importance is, however, 
comparable: “To know [the Way] is not as good as to love it, and to love it is not 
as good as to take delight in it” (ibid., p. 84). Knowing and being able may come 
first, only then may the student begin to appreciate (or love) the subject of his or her 
knowledge of capabilities and to later relish – with increasing “mastery” – his or her 
knowledge and capabilities.
Which idea impresses more? Who is right? Confucius or Whitehead? Is it an 
empirical question? You would like to answer such questions with that it entirely 
depends on the situation, the person, the subject matter and so on – but why should 
you like to deny that romance could be the consequence of what has been acquired 
tediously before?
Ideas cannot be proven, however, they can help, as mentioned, to guide the cognitive 
process; they can open up perspectives and offer orientation for describing and 
understanding social, psychological, political, ethical, spiritual, and aesthetic phenomena. 
The natural and cultural world can made accessible through ideas, i.e. with ideas, 
perception becomes richer, deeper, more meaningful. “Caring for ideas” is an idea of 
education in itself – maybe a truly important and slightly forgotten idea of education.
Conclusion: (Rather) Modest Ideas
To attach absolute, universal, generally accepted claims of validity to political, ethical, 
or religious ideas seems no longer appropriate or even dangerous for a pluralistic and 
multicultural as well as economically globalized and increasingly digitalized world. To 
the ethos of the “crooked wood” or a civility or citizenry in line with the times belongs 
the demand from the individual not to let rigid impulses of truthfulness lead his or her 
actions and thoughts. The capability and the willingness to regulate emotions and 
domesticate behaviors certainly belong into this category. In decent societies (cf. 
Margalit, 1998), “you know” that it cannot or should not be that it is always and 
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strictly about the idea or the ideal of what is good, beautiful and true, but rather about 
what is decent, pleasing, and appropriate, about socially acceptable arrangements under 
not-ideal conditions of human cohabitation, characteristic for the situation. For this 
reason, there is mistrust in decent societies regarding the fanatic search for truth and 
the swift discrimination of morally precarious behaviors. 
Diverse people or groups of people who do not know each other for the most part 
and, therefore, do not understand each other – or also: do not understand each other, 
because they do not know each other – live probably better together, or side by side at 
least, taken as a whole if they do not let themselves being led by the imperative of 
authentic expression. Accordingly, it is part of a decent individual that he or she is not 
only anything but a truth monger, but also capable to turn a blind eye sometimes – not 
to drag everything into the spotlight. Sometimes it is apparently about the fact that 
certain things are better kept in the dark, sometimes it is about to present them in a 
certain and maybe not too bright a light. A “decent” individual knows, therefore, that 
the truth does not only enlighten but also destroy – and what it destroys is by no 
means only “false meaning,” but it can also be productive or “positive illusions” (cf. 
Taylor, 1993), i.e. prejudices that make life more human. It appears to me that the 
assumption that complete impartiality (which is impossible, of course) would make the 
world more human is not able to provide sound reasons. According to the sociologist 
Karl Otto Hondrich, sometimes “the illusion of truthfulness has to give way to the 
normality of not-knowing and the twilight of discretion” (2002, p. 163). 
Modest or rather modest ideas may, therefore, have a positive influence on a normal, 
everyday life as well. Thereby, the culturally underlying “great ideas” of what is good, 
just, or beautiful are not weakened in their regulative potential, but their destructive 
potential will be tamed hopefully. 
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